Memetics via Strategic Mimicry

...But the evolutionary mechanism need not be a question of life or death [i.e. the gene].

With intelligent players, a successful strategy can appear more often in the future because other players convert to it. The conversion can be based on more or less blind imitation of the successful players, or it can be based on a more or less informed process of learning.
(p169-170)

The mechanics of the evolution of cooperation can be Classical Darwinian survival of the fittest and mutation, but they can also involve more deliberate processes such as imitation [mime-] of successful patterns of behavior and intelligently designed new strategic ideas [meme-]. (p175)

The Evolution of Cooperation 
Robert Axelrod, 1984
revised edition w foreword by R. Dawkins, 2006

for further talk and controversial ideas against Axelrod's theory, see this Edge conversation:

ON "ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA CONTAINS STRATEGIES THAT DOMINATE ANY EVOLUTIONARY OPPONENT" 
William H. Press,  Freeman Dyson [6.18.12]

The Shadow of the Future

The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the relationship. (p182)

Rapid turnover results in less cooperation within an organization – no reputation to uphold, no shadow of the future. (p183)

Promote cooperation by extending the shadow of the future
-increase frequency of interaction
-(by keeping others out of a neighborhood or territory, a small community can promote cooperation better than a larger community.)

The Evolution of Cooperation 
Robert Axelrod, 1984
revised edition w foreword by R. Dawkins, 2006

for further talk and controversial ideas against Axelrod's theory, see this Edge conversation:

ON "ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA CONTAINS STRATEGIES THAT DOMINATE ANY EVOLUTIONARY OPPONENT" 
William H. Press,  Freeman Dyson [6.18.12]

Law Enforcement and Reputation

“The Government and the Governed”

The government’s role is to make sure that each citizen “will be forced to be free”
–Rousseau, 1762/1950, The Social Contract, p18

A government must elicit compliance from the majority of the governed…[which] requires setting and enforcing the rules so that it pays for most of the governed to obey most of the time.

A government must deter its citizens from breaking the law. For example, to collect taxes effectively, a government must maintain a reputation for prosecuting tax evaders. The government often spends far more investigating and prosecuting evaders than it acquires from the penalties levied against them. The government’s goal, of course, is to maintain a reputation for catching and prosecuting evaders to deter anyone contemplating tax evasion in the future. And what is true for tax collection is also true for many forms of policing: the key to maintaining compliant behavior from the citizenry is that the government remains able and willing to devote resources far out of proportion to the stakes of the current issue in order to maintain its reputation for toughness. (p155)


The Evolution of Cooperation 
Robert Axelrod, 1984
revised edition w foreword by R. Dawkins, 2006


for further talk and controversial ideas against axelrod's theory, see this Edge conversation:
ON "ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA CONTAINS STRATEGIES THAT DOMINATE ANY EVOLUTIONARY OPPONENT" 
William H. Press,  Freeman Dyson [6.18.12]

On Intent

The individuals do not have to be rational: the evolutionary process allows the successful strategies to thrive, even if the players do not know why or how. (p173)

If bacteria can play games, so can people and nations. (p174)

The Evolution of Cooperation 
Robert Axelrod, 1984
revised edition w foreword by R. Dawkins, 2006